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As the presence of extremist organizations expand into the Sahel, so does the projection of U.S. 
military power. The United States’ most recent and poignant example of intelligence failure was 
the belief that the Iraqi population would treat the invading force of 2003 as liberators. Future 
events in Mali will have an outsized effect on the region. The receptiveness of Malians toward 
Western military presence and the ability to ascertain that information are important to 
intelligence, military, and diplomatic officials. In this study, I explore the effect that an interviewer, 
residing in either an urban or rural area, has on a subject’s receptiveness to Western military 
presence. I argue that rural Malians, when interviewed by urban Malians, will be less favorable to 
Western military presence than if they were interviewed by a fellow rural Malian. The argument 
also supports the vice versa—urban Malians will be more open to Western military presence when 
interviewed by rural Malians, versus another urban Malian. I used the sixth installment of 
Afrobarometer data, specific to Mali, to conduct this study. The results revealed a relationship that 
was inverse to my hypothesis. The findings were not statistically significant under the traditional 
standard, but were close enough to warrant further research and have implications. 
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Introduction 
 You’re a public servant of the United States Government entrusted with advising 
decision-makers on affairs in your area of expertise. You manage a multi-disciplinary 
interagency cadre that produces understanding and insights, for the consumption of government 
planners, on anything that touches your field. Although your work has never reached the 
President’s desk, there is a lot of reason to be proud of your career, even if your impact is trivial 
within the scope of U.S. strategic interests. 
An unforeseen, sudden, and tragic event occurs capturing the nation’s attention. The 
precipitants and implications fall into your previously overlooked domain of experience and 
knowledge. Overnight you are thrust into a position where you and your team’s assessments are 
informing the upper echelon of decision-makers on high stakes affair—some of that information 
is even being read by the President. While the weight of the decisions being made far exceeds the 
U.S. Government’s capabilities to understand the situation, urgency requires that these 
momentous decisions be made with the advice that can be produced within the limitations of 
your team. The decisions you make now have the potential to carry extraordinary consequences. 
That illustration will evoke many historical scenarios in the reader’s mind. The Central 
Intelligence Agency’s chief of station in Kabul on the heels of the black swan event September 
11th, 2001.1 2 A State Department conference room lined with experts on Iraqi history and culture 
that are reviewing the occupation plan for the 21st century war with Iraq. The military planner 
gazing at a television screen in the Pentagon as Arab Spring protests erupt in Syria, without 
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foreshadowing the future humanitarian crisis, war, and emerging extremist organization that will 
monopolize American national discourse. 
There are two reflexes to this thought experiment. One is to think back to those historical 
anecdotes. The other reflex, and the motivation that prompted this study’s research, is to think 
forward to when history will repeat itself next. Most Americans would be caught off guard by 
the notion that Sub-Saharan Africa is the future theater of war for the United States. However, 
Americans are becoming more acquainted with this scenario, as recent events in 2017 are 
reaching the conglomerate news networks. 
The United States sustained the first combat causality (an operator of the Naval Special 
Warfare Development Group) in Somalia since the infamous 1993 incident known in popular 
culture as “Black Hawk Down.”3 In Niger, four members of the Army Special Forces were killed 
during contact with hostile forces.4 Another Special Forces solider was murdered by two 
nefarious fellow special operation soldiers in Mali.5 
There is ample reason to believe the U.S. national security apparatus will only become 
more entrenched in the Sahel region. While this might be the case, the Middle East dominates the 
resources of the national security apparatus and the U.S. government’s capabilities to understand 
and forecast in Africa are lacking. A recent exercise of military strategy supports both sentiments 
that U.S. involvement in Sub-Sharan Africa will increase coupled with the inability to preempt 
large tragedies. Military planners took part in a simulation predicated on a major terrorist attack 
on U.S. soil, launched from West Africa, precipitating a protracted U.S. military occupation of 
Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali. 
                                                 
3 Cooper, 2017 
4 Tomlinson, 2017 
5 Maurer, 2017 
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 Think about it again. You’re a public servant of the United States Government entrusted 
with advising decision-makers on affairs of the West African nation of Mali. The decisions you 
make now will be of consequence—on some level—but won’t be consequential on the scale of 
long-term U.S. geopolitical interests. However, you know that the separation, between that 
current reality and a reality where your decisions carry extraordinary consequences, could be as 
thin as a sudden single event. Knowing the advice you craft could abruptly underpin the direction 
of U.S. strategic interests for multiple generations compels you to not be content with adequacy 
in the present and to be diligent in safeguarding the future. 
For most of the people reading this, that is not the case. But somewhere in Washington 
D.C. and other places around the globe, likely with an American flag flying in the near vicinity, 
that description captures the current situation of a real public servant. For most readers, the 
research presented in this study is, at the least, intellectually stimulating (or boring and 
irrelevant, and they are questioning why they are still reading) and, at the most, another 
incremental improvement to the scholarly knowledge of their field. But somewhere in the world, 
whether in high-tech offices or on unpaved dirt roads, there is a public servant that mulls over 
problems we will never know and they will never receive recognition for. The aspiration of this 
study is to provide actionable insights for those public servants described above that work in the 
United States Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, and Department of State. 
 
Current situation in Mali 
 Mali’s current state is arguably that of crisis. In 2013, the French deployed military 
assistance to Mail, which was followed by the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission within 
Stanley, 2017  5 
 
that year.6 7 These were in reaction to violence precipitated from a separatist movement in the 
northern part of Mali. The secular separatists sought to create the state of Azawad. Violence 
escalated with a spillover of well-armed Muslim extremists from the Libyan civil war and 
homegrown jihadist groups.8 While the intervention of French forces and the UN peacekeeping 
mission ameliorated the situation, conflict still characterize Mali’s current state.9 Mali has 
become a theater for militant Islamist groups and the typical global stakeholders in the fight 
against terrorism and violent extremism. 
The United States Military’s Africa Command has viewed Mali as a strategic interest 
since early on in the War on Terror. While the U.S. has expressed interest in establishing more 
long-term military and intelligence facilities in Mali, they have not been met with enthusiasm. 
The aversion to expansion of U.S. military bases is a sentiment shared by the electorates of 
numerous African countries. However, the United States has still been able to disperse military 
hardware and highly trained units across the continent, Mali included. While Mali might limit the 
amount of American military presence on the ground, it has seen an increase in the use of its air 
space to carry out anti-terrorism operations. This trend will only increase with the construction a 
nine figure American drone base in neighboring Niger. 
Mali’s plight is not only limited to conflict in the north. Mali’s strategic value is derived 
from being the access point to West Africa for North Africa. While this makes it attractive for 
extremists, it also makes it part of a smuggling corridor where African migrants seek to reach the 
Mediterranean Sea and then cross to mainland Europe.10 In the opposite direction, weapons flow 
                                                 
6 Operation Serval, 2017 
7 MINUSMA Facts and Figures 
8 Mali crisis: Key players, 2013 
9 Karlsrud, 2015 
10 Smith, 2015 
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from the Libyan conflict towards West Africa. Of lesser peril, Mali is also waypoint for the 
airborne trafficking of cocaine in to Europe. In addition, Mali’s bottom tier performance on 
health metrics is only aggravated by the fact that female genital mutilation is prevalent across the 
country—the rate of any given area is well into the ninety percents.11 
 
Area of Research and Importance 
This study will be examining, amongst Malians, if there is an apparent casual relation 
between urban/rural enumerator and their favorability to western military presence. More 
specifically, the mechanism being examined is whether two people’s residence (interacting with 
each other in an interviewee/interviewer context) in either rural or urban areas primes them to be 
more or less amendable to a western military presence. 
This study explores this topic to offer actionable information to intelligence officials, 
military planners and foreign policy actors. For reasons that will be enumerated in later sections, 
Western powers are not only going to pursue increasing military presence on the African 
continent, but in Mali in particular. While Africa has a history of head of states that are resistant 
to public opinion, they are not entirely immune. The opinions of inhabitants will affect the 
decision-makers responsible for the degree to which the United States and other Western nations 
project military power within their nations. 
Further, the subsequent sections shall also enumerate as to why urban-rural divisions are 
of interest for Western strategists. Divisions such as gender and race are arguably the most 
prominent divisions amongst humans. This is not surprising given that sight is paramount in our 
repertoire of senses and the aforementioned classifications can be patently deduced without 
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failure from our vision. This obviousness elicits a magnifying glass from researchers. Thus, this 
study hopes to be consequential by contributing to the literature of a less flushed out but still 
deterministic quality. 
Another subject under the proverbial magnifying glass is the enumerator effect of 
interviewers. Social desirability bias and the subconscious effects of priming are well studied. 
Their effect on the validity of research makes them an ongoing interest of academics, among 
other reasons for their perpetual appearance in scientific literature. This study adds to the 
literature on the effects evoked by the convergence of the two concepts. More importantly, it 
examines a characteristic at play, urban/rural residency, that is more subtle than the 
characteristics often examined and attempts to predict its effect. 
This study will be carried out using data provided by the Afrobarometer’s sixth round of 
data collection. This data will limited to the subsect from surveyed Malians. 
 
Findings 
The results and analysis suggest that the interviewer, in the study’s context, questioning a 
subject of the alternate residence (i.e. urban or rural) substantially affects the subject’s responses 
on multiple questions related to favorability towards Western military presence. This is in 
comparison to responses given by the subject when questioned by an interviewer of the same 
residency. This finding was not statistically significant; however it was close enough to the 
domain of statistical significance to warrant further investigation. 
The findings also demonstrate a strong and very statistically significant relationship 
between responses indicating favorability to Western military presence and the region a subject 
lives in, as it relates to geographic area occupied at the height of the northern Mali crisis. 
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Interestingly, the effect alone of the subject residing in either an urban or rural area was only 
moderate and not close to being statistically significant. This is despite the significant effects of 
both the interviewee-interviewer mismatch and proximity to formerly occupied areas and the 




 Mali, officially referred to as the Republic of Mali, is a landlocked and relatively large 
country, whose territory inhabits both West Africa and North Africa. Mali’s challenges are 
multifarious. In the 2016 Human Development Index (HDI) it ranked 175th out of 188.12 Yet, its 
HDI score has doubled in the last 25 years since it was first included in the index. The majority 
of Mali’s territory is situated in the Sahara Desert. However, the southernmost portion of the 
country lies in a tropical savannah environment with a band of semi-arid climate, know as the 
Sahel, separating the savannah from the Sahara. At least three quarters of the populations resided 
in these two climates south of the Sahara Desert. Some estimates put the percentage at over 90% 
 Muslims compose over 90% of the 18 million Malian population13. The official language 
for the country is French, however the lingua franca is Bambara. There over 40 indigenous 
African languages spoken by dozens of ethnicities in Mali.14 The plurality are the Bambara. The 
majority of Malians live in rural areas and the agricultural sector is a dominant industry, 
contributing 80% of Mali’s exports in conjunction with livestock. The largest export is cotton. 
                                                 
12 Human Development Reports, 2015 
13 Demographics of Mali, 2017 
14 Mali, Countries and Their Cultures 
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However, gold is the most lucrative export; Mali is the 3rd largest producer of gold on the 
resource-rich continent. 
FIGURE 1 




Violence and conflict are not new trends to Africa, since the colonial times. Africa has 
been dominated by intra-border conflicts rather than the inter-border conflicts that characterize 
the history of Western powers. The nature of this intra-border violence is reflected in the size of 
the armed actors, which usually remain in the range of small militias to the state military. 
However, there has been trend towards larger forces, with superior capabilities, that are 
multinational or unilateral Western powers intervening in intra-border conflicts. 
The increasing deployment of multinational forces can be observed in the uptick of pan-
African and regional block military interventions. The Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) has been very militarily active in the 21st century with five military 
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interventions.15 Mali was recipient of one in the 2013 northern Mali crisis. The most recent 
occurred this year, 2017, with an invasion the Gambia to fulfill the outcome of their democratic 
election.16 The African Union has deployed troops for peacekeeping purposes as well; Sudan in 
mid 2000s, Somalia since 2007, and there is prospect for a new peacekeeping mission in South 
Sudan.17  
Increasing presence of multinational military forces also occurs through platforms 
broader than the African continent. United Nations (UN) peacekeeping began in the Cold War, 
but the end of that era was followed by a dramatic growth the UN peacekeeping force. Robust 
peacekeeping operations in Africa started in 1989. There have since been 22 completed 
peacekeeping missions, representing two-fifths of past peacekeeping missions on the globe. Of 
the existent peacekeeping missions, nine out of the sixteen are in Africa. Limiting it to missions 
with at least military troops in the four-digits, Africa comprises six of the seven major 
peacekeeping operations.  
Not only has the number of UN peacekeeping missions increased, but the scope of 
peacekeeping operations has also expanded. In 2013, the UN took the unprecedented step of 
authorizing the first offensive action in UN peacekeeping history. Resolution 2098 formed the 
United Nation Force Intervention Brigade within the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).18 The resolution designated the 
unit’s mission as the proactive and forceful disarmament of armed rebel groups in the Kivus of 
Eastern Congo. 
                                                 
15 The 5 previous West African military interventions, 2017 
16 Saine, 2017 
17 South Sudan conflict, 2016 
18 United Nations, 2013 
Stanley, 2017  11 
 
The trend in multination militaries occupying soil they are foreign to is a valid reason to 
understand how native populations perceive foreign military presence, including Western 
presence. However, a trend that is even more of a signal of increasing Western military presence 
is the expansion of terrorism and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). In the 21st century, 
terrorism is arguably the best predictor of conspicuous Western military presence. The United 
States, the world’s unparalleled military superpower, is particularly incited by terrorism. This 
study’s author assumes, for better or for worse, that as long as terrorism evokes a visceral 
reaction in the American electorate, counter-terrorism efforts will be the corner stone of U.S. 
foreign policy and the projection of military power. The United States and its over 800 overseas 
military bases are undaunted in pursuing terrorism afflicting the United States, wherever it goes. 
In the minds of many Westerners and Americans, terrorism is geographically 
synonymous with the Middle East. However, terrorism and extremism has encroached far into 
the African continent. Aside from the existence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, potential terrorism on the continent can be seen as driven from north Africa by militants 
embroiled in the violent conflicts. However, the spread of that extremism has steadily been 
making its way down south. 
The Sahel, a semi-arid belt straddling the south of the Sahara, is a strategic region for the 
passage of extremist human capital and resources from North Africa to the rest of the continent. 
The Sahel has become the lynchpin of the effort to contain violent extremism. The Sahel is 
mostly composed of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan, although it includes other 
countries such as Burkina Faso. Mali’s position in the Sahel is pivotal in the Sahel. Not only 
does it occupy a significant swath of the Sahel, but also it is a critical piece of West Africa. 
Whatever happens in Mali will have an outsized influence on the region. 
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An influx of extremists into Mali has been fueled by access to capital and arms. The 
dissolution of the Gaddafi autocracy left tens of thousands of weapons unaccounted for and 
dispersed extremists across the region.19 Weapons and militants have steadily flowed from Libya 
into Mali. This flow has been lubricated by cash from drugs going in the opposite direction. 
Narcotics are trafficked from West Africa into North Africa, where they will head to their end 
destination in Europe, through Mali. Capital from the drug trade combines with ransom money to 
fund regional VEOs.20 
Connecting the dots, you can see that the U.S. and Western powers will continue to 
bolster military presence around the Sahel to preclude VEOs from expanding south into the 
continent or carrying out overseas attacks. Just as the Sahel is the gatekeeper to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Mali is the gatekeeper to West Africa and thus attracts increasing Western military 
presence. 
Even without drawing connections between these facts, there are numerous documented 
Western military commitments to expansion in Africa. Starting in 2014, German politicians have 
been pushing for increased military contributions to the continent. While the discourse has not 
settled on what criteria needs to be meet to solicit German military aid, this rhetoric has already 
proven consequential.21 The French have continued to maintain their military commitment to the 
Sahel with 3,000 troops allocated to Operation Burkhane. 
The U.S. Military counter-terrorism effort in Africa that we have come to know of today 
can be traced back to the Pan-Sahel Initiative starting in 2002.22 The first permanent military 
base on the African continent was Djibouti; an oasis of calmness sandwiched between Eritrea 
                                                 
19 Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa, 2013 
20 Welsh, 2012 
21 Hanisch, 2015 
22 Turse, 2015 Nov. 20 
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and Somalia (albeit more accurately bordering stable Somaliland) strategically positioned at the 
bottleneck of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The base, Camp Lemonnier has been used to 
launch counterpiracy operations and counterterrorism operations in the Arab Peninsula and in the 
region. Thus far, Camp Lemonnier is the only permanent military base in Africa. However, it is 
important to not interpret that fact superficially; there is an array of U.S. Military facilities across 
Africa, often termed “Forward operating Sites” or “Cooperative Security Locations.”23 While 
they are technically not “Main Operating Bases”, they have not been proven as anything other 
than de facto permeant bases. 
The cornerstone of American counter-terrorism in areas where it has not declared war is 
the use of drones. Currently, there are eleven known active American drone bases in Africa.24 
They span from Seychelles to Tunisia and Ethiopia to Burkina Faso. They fight “VEOs,” violent 
extremist organizations, that range from Al-Shabaab to Boko Haram through bases in Somalia 
and Cameroon, respectively.25 The U.S. Military’s commitment can be epitomized with a 100 
million dollar drone base being constructed in Agadez—geographic/territorial heart of Niger—to 
carry out operations against terrorism in the Sahel.26 
Where one looks, one can find a doubling down on these “non-permanent” installations. 
The United States has opened multiple supporting facilities in Cameroon. Its proximity and 
apparent lack of strong-handed action to human rights abuses by Cameroonians on shared 
military facilities speaks to the degree that the U.S. Military might be co-mingled with African 
military forces.27 The United States has continued to fortify bases in both Agadez and Niamey of 
                                                 
23 Pike 
24 List of United States drone bases, 2017 
25 Hammer, 2016 
26 Turse, Sept. 29 
27 Trafford, 2017 
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Niger, even though one of the reasons for creating the base at Agadez was to drawdown the 
hardware in Niamey.28 Even the sole permanent base on the continent wasn’t satisfactory for the 
American military ambition. The U.S. Military in 2013 began the creation of a drone facility in 
Djibouti outside the permanent Camp Lemonnier.29 
In 2006, 1% of all overseas commandos were in Africa.30 In 2010, that figure was 3%. By 
2016, it had climbed to 17%.31 currently there are at least 6,000 troops on the continent that 
conduct over 3,500 exercises, programs, and engagements every year.32 According to the head of 
special operations command in Africa, Army General Donald Bolduc, “at any given time, you 
will find SOCAFRICA conducting approximately 96 activities in 20 countries.” In October of 
this year, after doing a briefing with Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Senator Lindsey 
Graham told reports “You’re going to see more actions in Africa, not less.” Perhaps most telling 
was a recent expansive war game conducted by the war colleges of all military branches and 
other entities in the military apparatus. The war game depicted a major terrorist attack on 
American soil that prompted an invasion of West Africa to combat the safe havens of Al-
Qaida.33 
  
                                                 
28 Turse, 2017, Oct. 26 
29 Turse, 2015, Oct. 21 
30 United States, Government Accountability Office 
31 Turse, 2017 May 18 
32 Turse, VICE News 
33 Turse, 2017, Oct. 22 





The relevance of this whole study is predicated on the fact that urban-rural upbringings 
manifest tangibly, whether the identities are salient or latent at the time. The division between 
urban and rural identities is not only well documented, it is a pillar of how academics understand 
the Africa’s history from colonialism to the modern day.34 
However, scholarly work was limited on how urban-rural residence affects perception of 
western militaries. In the absence of that specificity, with the lens of urban-rural divisions, I will 
look at the broader issue how it can affect attitudes towards Westerners. Likewise, the field of 
literature is not as rich as preferable. Instead, I will be taking a comparative approach to infer 
dynamics between urban-rural divisions and attitudes towards Westerners. This study will 
instead use case examples of Ebola as proxy scenarios to explore how familiarity with Westerns 
affects the uptake of Western prescribed practices. The concept is that the Africans residing in 
urban areas will have higher exposure to Westerners and thus be more likely to adopt practices 
encouraged by Westerners. The relation can then be generalized to how urban-rural residency 
will affect a person’s openness to Western military presence, wherein greater exposure correlates 
with increased favorability. 
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa took the world by surprise. Prior to 2014, there 
had only been 18 major outbreaks (at least double-digit human infections).35 The highest number 
of human cases was 425 in Uganda at the beginning of the century. The highest number of 
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deaths, 318, was in 1976 in what was then Zaire. With at least 28,616 human cases and 11,310 
deaths, the 2014 Ebola outbreak had more than ten times the number of human cases than all 
previous outbreaks combined and had death toll forty times higher than the previous most lethal 
outbreak—Zaire 1976. 
The global healthcare apparatus was tested in a way that it had not been before and the 
world was reeling in its wake. The event demonstrated that global health emergency 
preparedness was not sufficient and was vulnerable to infectious disease outbreaks with a 
different dispersive journey (e.g. if it disseminated in Lagos) or diseases with higher 
transmissibility. Since then there has been a lot of post-mortem research conducted to rectify the 
deficiency in global emergency medical responsiveness.36 So while the outbreak was a recent 
event, the availability of the literature makes it a convenient case study to infer how differences 
in rural and urban areas manifest tangibly 
The differences in urban and rural outcomes can be quite distinct with regards to Ebola. 
Typically outbreaks of Ebola are contained in distant rural areas with limited accessibility. This 
has been the pattern in five Ebola outbreaks in Uganda from 2000 to 2012. However, one 
outbreak spread from its rural origins to a densely packed urban district. This case highlights the 
differences in rural and urban. 
The rural communities were quick to mobilize and quarantine the infected persons and 
the people that had substantial contact with them.37 researchers attributed the ability to mobilize 
quickly to strong communal spirit within the rural community. Whereas, the urban district was 
not only afflicted by the population density, but also by the fact that people did not abide by 
orders from authority figures. 
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The differences in attitudes could be explained through exposure and acculturation to the 
West—the progression from collectivism to individualism. As Africans move to urban centers 
and experience Western culture more routinely in their lives, they adopt more Western 
attitudes.38 This is supported by quantitative research, with a small sample size, in Kenya that 
depicted a negative association between education and urbanization (reflectors of Western 
exposure) and self-concepts of collectivism.39 Research on other parts of the world comes to 
similar findings.40 The observation that Africans residing in urban areas are more exposed to the 
West and thus embody more “Western” attitudes naturally leaps to the conclusion that those 
urban dwellers are more favorable to the West. 
In the 2014 Ebola outbreak, a devastating cycle was documented. Rural communities in 
Liberia already experience severe poverty and food insecurity. Poor nutrition and insufficient 
health services amplified the impact of Ebola in the rural areas of Liberia. Further, Ebola reduced 
the available human labor, in turn reducing the agriculture yield and furthering food insecurity.41 
The repercussions of this will be felt beyond the outbreak of Ebola, especially in the disruption 
of education, which will have longstanding impacts. 
Liberians in urban areas benefited from more pre-existing infrastructure and better living 
conditions, as well as, being more accessible for international organizations. Liberians residing 
in the urban areas also appeared to more easily adopt education from international organizations. 
Researchers surveying community leaders found that community leaders did not want basic 
information about Ebola.42 Their constituents had already internalized that information. Instead 
                                                 
38 Argyle, 1967 
39 Ma, 1997 
40 Altrocchi, 1995 
41 Stanturf, 2015 
42 Abramowitz, 2015 
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they were seeking more technical information—training and best practices—that would be 
actionable for the population. This is juxtaposed to what the researchers studying Ebola in rural 
Liberia noted, “[c]ultural beliefs and practices, such as washing corpses before burial and 
touching at funerals, played an important role in transmission of EVD.” This apparent easy 
uptake of rudimentary information regarding Ebola aligns with the idea that urban Liberians 
would find practices from Westerners more palatable than rural Liberians. This would indicate 
that urban Liberians are more receptive to the West than rural Liberians. 
 
Effects of two party interactions 
On its face, the data presented here could represent important insights and have 
ramifications for U.S. and Western policy. However, the data is limited by the fact that it 
represents one point in time and is quantitative information from questions crafted by a third 
party. This alone is not actionable for Western powers. As would be expected, the United States 
and its allies would take the diligence to conduct their own assessment, pivoting on intelligence 
they gather. The ability to collect accurate intelligence is at the core of the intelligence 
organizations and international network that serve Western powers. In conjunction, these entities 
also lay the groundwork for future official military deployments through a series of covert 
activities. These activities often hinge on the receptiveness of locals that are working with 
Westerners. 
In investigating how urban-rural residency effects favorability for Western military 
presence, this study will also touch upon how the urban or rural residence of two individuals 
affects the receptiveness of one participant and in turn their opinion on Western military 
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presence. It is the aspiration of this study that these insights will have practical application for 
how Western powers go about ascertaining and influencing the opinion on the ground. 
The available literature will help to understand how another person affects the 
interactions of the person of interest. The data being used was gathered in an interviewer-
interviewee format. The validity of data obtained through an interview is a topic of high 
importance in the scientific community. The literature is clear that features of the interviewer do 
manifest consequentially in results. It has been demonstrated that the race of an interviewer 
affects attitudinal, behavioral, and even political-knowledge indicators.43 44 45 The research 
shows that female interviewers disclosed more information on sensitive topics and are told more 
egalitarian answers.46 47 48 49 
While urban and rural features are not as apparent as gender or race, it is still more than 
plausible that those features would affect the data obtained in an interview. This is particularly 
conceivable in Africa where urban-rural residency can manifest in superficial appearance, 
mannerisms, or attitudes. Policy makers should be cognizant of the influence that the dynamic of 
two people’s residency/upbringing can have on the data collected. Extensive research on priming 
has demonstrated that the actions of humans are quite susceptible to subtle stimuli.50 This study 
will attempt to demonstrate that the dynamics of interviewer-interviewee’s residence are 
consequential in the interactions of the interviewee. 
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Research on psychology concerning global warming beliefs provides guidance for how 
the aforementioned effects will manifest. Numerous studies have been published that 
demonstrate that people with opinions that diverge from the scientific literature (i.e. humans only 
contribute a little to global warming, global warming is a hoax) are arriving at their opinion 
independent of factors that would be expected (e.g. education level) and it can be predicted by 
variables associated with group identity.51 One study of 1,540 Americans revealed that people 
identified as dismissive of climate science were more dismissive as scientific literacy and 
numeracy increased.52 The people identified as predisposed to credit the climate science had a 
decrease in dismissiveness as scientific literacy and numeracy increased. The authors suggest 
that cultural polarization is driven by conflict of rationality at the individual level and collective 
level. 
The most poignant example in this genre, is an experiment that examine the effect of 
exposure to evidence, objectively supporting the scientific consensus, of global warming had on 
beliefs. The experiments was constructed that exposed subjects to an anecdotal piece of scientific 
literature that could not rationally be interpreted any other way than the anecdote supporting the 
conclusion that global warming is real and primarily caused by humans. Intuitively, one would 
expect that all subjects’ opinions would move closer to certainty in global warming being a 
human-made phenomena. Instead, researchers found that the subject’s original belief was only 
intensified. People that believed global warming was real and human-caused believed in that 
belief stronger. Yet, people that believed global warming was a hoax or not caused by humans 
became stronger in the disbelief. 
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This study posits that a similar dynamic will occur with the interviewee. Opposing traits 
between the respondent and the interviewer that have strong cultural implications will lead to an 
effect that resembles the outcomes of the global warming psychology research. Urban and rural 
cultural divisions will be significant if the interviewee is interviewed by an interviewer from the 
contrary residence. In those situations a culturally polarizing effect will manifest. 
 
Hypothesis 
 This study accepts the premise that Malians from urban areas will have more exposure to 
the Westerners than rural Malians. Thus, Malians from urban areas will, to a degree, represent 
Western influence in the eyes of rural Malians. Therefore, being interviewed by an urban Malian 
will educe a polarizing dynamic that evokes stronger anti-western feelings in a rural Malian. This 
will manifest in rural Malians having less support for Western military presence when 
interviewed by an urban Malian than when by a fellow rural Malian. 
 Vice versa should also hold. An urban Malian will see a Malian from a rural area as 
turning way from modernity. Therefore, urban Malians when confronted with a rural interviewer 
will have an emotional reflex to double down on Western influences. Thus, urban Malians will 
be more favorable to Western military intervention when interviewed by rural Malian than when 
interviewed by a fellow urban Malian. 
 
H0:  Malians, when interviewed by an interviewer that resides in the complementary 
residency, will have more or less favorability to Western military presence than if 
interviewed by someone of the same residency 
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Data and Methodology 
Source of Data 
 The data used in this study was survey data collected in Mali in 2014 by Afrobarometer. 
Afrobarometer describes itself as “a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts 
public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues.” 
Afrobarometer surveys Africans in various countries every two years. This data comes from their 
sixth round, which was released in 2016 and surveyed 36 African countries. In 2001, Mali was 
one of two countries in the very first round conducted. It has since been present in the last three 
of six total installments. 
 Interviewers have one business week of training.53 The content includes survey methods, 
field protocol, and local language considerations. The survey is typically conducted in the 
popular indigenous language. The data is encoded and vetted by their national partners and then 
checked by data managers at and external to Afrobarometer. 
 The sampling of the Afrobarometer survey is designed to be nationally representative. 
Beyond random sampling at multiple stages, the sampling is devised so any individual’s 
probability of being selected is proportional to the population size relative to geographic area.54 
The gender of the subject is deliberately alternated each sequential interview. Sample sizes per 
country are typically 1,200 or 2,400 participants. 
  The Afrobarometer survey asks questions regarding multiple topics. Most topics are 
regarded as central topics and thus some questions’ presence is consistent longitudinally and 
across all countries surveyed. Some topics are considered special topics and their relevance can 
                                                 
53 Surveys and methods, Afrobarometer 
54 Round 6 Survey Manual, 2014 
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depend on the survey round. There are also country-specific questions. The survey consists of 
one hundred questions asked to the respondent. However, the majority of these questions have 
multiple parts. Combined with questions answered by the interviewer, the survey produces data 




% of n  Std. Dev 
Favorability towards Western military presence    13.3  0.34 
Urban Malian interviewed by Rural Malian     8.6  0.28 
Rural Malian interviewed by Urban Malian     50.1  0.50 
Reached tertiary education       1.4  0.12 
Some formal education       26.8  0.44 
No formal education        64.1  0.48 
Atheist/apatheist        4.6  0.21 
Follower of traditional religion      1.3  0.11 
Denominational Muslim       10.8  0.31 
Muslim         78.2  0.41 
Denominational Christian       3.4  0.18 
Resides in rural area        74.7  0.44 
Resides in region distant from area previously occupied by extremists 60.7  0.49 
Resides in region previously occupied by extremists    10.0  0.30 
Arab-Berber         2.8  0.16 
Non-Mande Sub-Saharan African      24.8  0.43 
Mande Sub-Saharan African       60.8  0.49 
Female         50.0  0.50 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Not receptive to interviewer         2.2          1.7         1        13 
Age           40.2         14.6        18                   86 




 The primary outcome of interest, receptiveness to Western military presence—our 
dependent variable, is an amalgam of three questions from the Afrobarometer data. The 
participant must suffice two criteria to be coded as favorable toward Western military presence. 
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The first is that they are open to foreign military presence. This is determined by providing a 
specific response to at least one of two questions. 
 Question Q85A_MLI is one question, wherein a participant’s response could lead to them 
being coded as receptive to Western military presence. Q85A_MLI asks “[i]n your opinion, 
which of the following options offers now the best chance of resolving the crisis in northern 
Mali.” The available responses are: none of these options, negotiations between the Government 
and armed groups, the war between FAMA and armed groups, the intervention of foreign armed 
forces, north secession, and don’t know. The answer “intervention of foreign armed forces” 
bluntly broaches the subject of foreign military presence. Participants that respond with this 
answer suffice the first criteria—openness to foreign military presence—for determining support 
for Western military presence. 
 Question Q86B1_MLI is the second question that can establish receptivity to foreign 
military presence. Question Q86B1_MLI asks “[w]hat would you consider the best way for the 
Government to be more effective in treating the problem of armed groups in northern Mali? And 
what would be the second best way.” The first answer is coded into question Q86B1_MLI, 
whereas the second response is coded into Q86B2_MLI. The secondary response to Q86B2_MLI 
is omitted because a corresponding second response is not collected for Q85A_MLI. The second 
response of Q86B2_MLI is excluded to preclude disproportionate weighting towards question 
Q86B*_MLI. This decision was also made because there is greater reliance on inference to deem 
a participant as open to foreign military presence from this question (as will be enumerated on 
below). 
The answers to question Q86B1_MLI are: nothing, the Government is already effective in 
fighting them, strengthen military response or capabilities, working with traditional leaders to 
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tackle the problem, working with religious leaders to address the problem, improve the economy 
and create more jobs, improve the education system, govern more effectively/deliver better 
public services, treat the communities of original extremists fairly, give more power to local 
authorities to make their own decisions, negotiations, and don’t know. Respondents that answer 
“strengthen military response or capabilities” are classified as favorable to foreign military 
presence. The reasoning for this deduction is that substantial improvement in the abilities of the 
Malian military requires the training and logistical support of advanced Western militaries. 
Further, the concept of improving the abilities of the Malian military is heavily associated with 
Western military aid. That is the rhetoric used to justify many of the Western military initiatives 
currently in Mali and it is the rhetoric that likely surfaces in discourse among Malians. 
Once favorability to foreign military presence is established, the next step is to qualify it 
to Western military presence. We arrive at this conclusion through sufficing the second criteria—
favorability to the West. This is assessed through question Q80A, which asks “[i]n your opinion, 
which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of 
our country.” The respondent answers were classified as either the United States, China, colonial 
power (ie. France, United Kingdom, Portugal), India, South Africa, “We should follow our own 
country’s model,” a country not listed, and don’t know. 
Presumably respondents were not prompted by the interviewer verbally saying “colonial 
power.” It is the understanding of this study that respondents answering with any former colonial 
power were categorized as “colonial power.” That data of the individual former colonial 
countries cited by the respondent is not available, which is unfortunate. However, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the decisive majority of those answers would have been France, Mali’s 
colonizer and key modern Western ally. 
Stanley, 2017  26 
 
If the interviewee’s response, to question Q80A, is either the United States or a colonial 
power, then it is considered to be favorable to the West. If receptiveness to foreign military 
presence is established—through the appropriate response to either aforementioned questions—
and receptivity to West is established, then both criteria have been sufficed to categorize a 
respondent as open to Western military presence. 
 
Z = Preference for foreign military intervention in northern Mali crisis (Q85A_MLI) 
Y = Belief that government needs to improve Malian military to respond to crisis (Q86B1_MLI) 
X = Opinion that a Western power is the best model for Mali (Q80A) 
J = Favorable to Western military presence (Dependent variable) 
 
( Z ∪ Y ) ∩ X = J 
 
This can be further broken down into: 
 
Z = Preference for foreign military intervention in northern Mali crisis (Q85A_MLI) 
Y = Belief that government needs to improve Malian military to respond to crisis (Q86B1_MLI) 
W = Opinion that the United States is the best model for Mali (Q80A) 
V = Opinion that a former colonial power is the best model for Mali (Q80A) 
J = Favorable to Western military presence (Dependent variable) 
 
( Z ∪ Y ) ∩ ( W ∪ V ) = J 
 
The sample size for each of these conditions is presented: 
 
( 95 ∪ 291 ) ∩ ( 229 ∪ 389 ) = J 
 
These values are then condensed (there was an overlap of 54 between Z and Y): 
 
( 332 ) ∩ ( 618 ) = J 
 
The final aggregation yields a sample size of 160 respondents classified under condition J: 
 
160 = J 
 
Independent Variable 
 The potential causal conditions we are investigating, the match/mismatch of 
interviewee’s and interviewer’s residency (urban or rural)—our independent variable, is a 
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product of two questions from the Afrobarometer data. These two binary questions produce four 
distinct categorizations that that an interviewee will be coded into. Both of these questions are 
answered by the interviewer. 
The two questions used are URBRUR and Q115. Question URBRUR is the third question 
in the survey and the first if we discount the first two (respondent number and if the back of the 
house was checked) as logistical questions. This question would be filled out before questions, 
with recorded answers, are directed at the interviewee. URBRUR is concerned with whether it is 
an urban or rural primary sampling unit. The only two responses are urban and rural. Question 
Q115 is in the section that succeeds questions directed at the interviewee. This section is 
answered by the interviewer and constitutes the conclusion of the data points collected. Question 
Q115 asks “[d]o you come from a rural or urban area.” The only possible answers are rural and 
urban. 
 
The matrix below in Figure 2 depicts the four classifications produced from these two questions: 
 
FIGURE 2 
Breakdown of independent variable: interviewee-interviewer residency match/mismatch 
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Intermediary Variable 
This study also examines a suspected intermediary variable—interviewee receptiveness 
to the interviewer, which is an agglomeration of six questions from the Afrobarometer data. This 
variable aggregates six ordinal questions, on a one through three scale, into a single value lying 
within a six through eighteen scale. This thirteen-point continuum is a composite of questions 
answered by the interviewer post-interview about the demeanor of the interviewee. These 
questions are the entire Q110 series (A through F denotation). 
The questions are as follows: “[w]hat was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the 
interview Was he or she: friendly, in between, or hostile” (Q110A); “[w]hat was the respondent’s 
attitude toward you during the interview Was he or she: interested, in between, or bored” 
(Q110B); “[w]hat was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the interview? Was he or she: 
cooperative, in between, or uncooperative” (Q110C); “[w]hat was the respondent’s attitude 
toward you during the interview? Was he or she: patient, in between, or impatient” (Q110D); 
“[w]hat was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the interview? Was he or she: at ease, in 
between, or suspicious” (Q110E); “[w]hat was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the 
interview? Was he or she: honest, in between, or misleading” (Q110F). 
 
Respectively, the responses are as follows: 
             1          2           3 
Q110A Friendly In between Hostile 
Q110B  Interested In between Bored 
Q110C  Cooperative In between Uncooperative 
Q110D Patient  In between Impatient 
Q110E  At ease In between Suspicious 
Q110F  Honest  In between Misleading 
 





 𝑻           𝑻 ≥  𝟔, 𝑻 ≤  𝟏𝟑  






A multivariate logistic regression was carried out to evaluate the relationship of the 
study’s dependent variable—favorability to Western military presence—with the independent 
variables of interest and control variables. 
𝑌𝑖 = Z0 + Z1𝑋1𝑖 + Z2𝑋2𝑖+ ...Z𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where, for each individual i, Y represents the favorability towards Western military 
presence, X1 through Xk represent all independent variables, Z0 represents the intercept, Z1 to Z𝑘 
represent the regression coefficients, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. The results are illustrated in Table 2 
 
TABLE 2 
Precipitates of favorability to Western Military Presence in Mali 
Supports Foreign Military 
Presence and has Favorable 
View of the West 
Not receptive to interviewer        -0.04 
           (0.06)  
Urban Malian interviewed by Rural Malian      -0.71 ţ 
(0.46) 
Rural Malian interviewed by Urban Malian      0.41 ţ 
           (0.25) 
Reached tertiary education        0.05 
           (0.63) 
Some formal education        0.24 
           (0.48) 
No formal education         0.16 
           (0.49) 
Atheist/apatheist         0.67 
           (0.85) 
Follower of traditional religion       0.39 
           (1.09) 
Denominational Muslim        0.61 
           (0.82) 
Muslim          0.41 
           (0.77) 
Denominational Christian        -0.27 
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           (0.98) 
Resides in rural area         -0.33 
           (0.34) 
Resides in region distant from area previously occupied by extremists  -0.58 *** 
           (0.22) 
Resides in region previously occupied by extremists     -1.16 *** 
           (0.41) 
Arab-Berber          1.17 * 
           (0.62) 
Non-Mande Sub-Saharan African       0.82 ** 
           (0.37) 
Mande Sub-Saharan African        0.55 ţ 
           (0.34) 
Age           -0.02 *** 
           (0.01) 
Female          -0.03 
           (0.19) 
Notes: asterisks reflect statistical significance. ţ, *, **, and *** denote a p-value less than 0.15. 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. These classifications are respectively referred to as relevant, 
moderate, strict, and strong statistical significance in the paper. 
 
 One of the two independent variables of interest, interviewee and interviewer rural and 
urban mismatch respectively, had an effect size of 0.41. Rural Malians interviewed by an urban 
Malian were 41% more likely to respond with answers that indicate they would be in support of 
Western military presence. However, it could only be classified as relevantly statistically 
significant in any form with P-value of 0.102. Yet it was on the verge of being moderately 
statistically significant.  
 The other independent variable of interest, interviewee and interviewer urban and rural 
mismatch respectively, had a relevant statistical significance (p-value of 0.120). However, the 
proximity to the realm of moderate statistical significance should be noted. It had substantial 
impact with an effect size of -0.71. Urban Malians interviewed by a rural Malian were 71% less 
likely to respond with answers that indicate they would be in support of Western military 
presence.  
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 These results do not meet the more stringent standards of statistical significance used in 
academia. However, those findings cannot be categorically dismissed as not having a relation. 
Further research is warranted. The effects the variables have where opposite to the effects 
predicted by the hypothesis, as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Receptiveness to Western military presence by independent variables 
 
 
The intermediary variable, receptiveness to the interviewer, was outside the range of 
statistical significance with a p-value of 0.479 and yielded an effect size of -0.04. Wherein, 
respondents where 4% less likely to support Western military presence for every unit that they 
increased on the 13-point metric of their receptiveness to the interviewer. 
There were four control variables, of the 16 evaluated, that met strict statistical 
significance—three of which had a strong statistical significance. Age had the most statistically 










Rural/Rural (n=295) Rural/Urban (n=601) Urban/Urban (n=201) Urban/Rural (n=103)
Percent favored Western Military Presence
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A predictable outcome was that a region’s proximity to the northern Mali crisis would 
have an instrumental effect on the dependent variable. The most pronounced results were 
whether a subject resided in a region distant from, affected by, or occupied by the extremists 
forces at the height of the northern Mali crisis. The region affected by extremists forces was 
omitted in the regression. Being distant from areas that had conflict at the peak of the extremists 
occupation where 58% more likely to not be supportive of Western military presence. This -0.58 
effect size was coupled with a strong P-value of 0.008. Even more impactful was the effect of 
residing in the regions that were occupied by extremists forces. the P-value was 0.005 and the 
effect size was -1.16. A person residing in regions occupied by extremists at the height if the 
northern Mali crisis were 116% more like to not respond with answers that indicated favorability 
to western military presence. This was the strongest effect towards disfavoring Western military 
presence of any of the variables measured. 
 Respondent ethnicity had varying statistical dependency depending on the ethnicity. The 
ethnic classification of a mix between Arab-Berber and Sub-Saharan African was left out. A 
person’s ethnicity being Sub-Saharan African (and not part Mande group of ethnicities) had an 
effect of 0.82. This result was strictly statistically significant with a p-value was 0.028. The Sub-
Saharan Africans that were part of the Mande ethnic umbrella had an effect size of 0.55, but only 
relevant statistical significance. The p-value was 0.111. Arab-Berber ethnicity had moderate 
statistical significance, with 0.057, and the strongest positively correlated effect size of any of 
the variables tested. At an effect size 1.18, the respondent being Arab-Berber led to a 118% 
increase in favoring Western military presence.  
 
The remainder of the variables evaluated were not statically significant in any form. 




 Decision-makers in the U.S. Intelligence Community, Military, and State Department 
want to know: are Malians receptive to an increase in American military hardware, does residing 
in an urban or rural area affect views on increasing foreign military presence, does a rural person 
faced with an urban person become more resentful towards the West, will the accuracy of human 
intelligence be affected by subtle dissimilarities between a subject and interviewer. This study 
contributes to the information that will be taken into account when decision-makers in the United 
States Government attempt to answer those questions. 
 This study set out to answer the question: is an opinion on Western military presence, of 
a Malian residing in an urban or rural area, affected by the interviewer residing in the opposite 
area. In this study, I posited that urban-rural divisions, while subtle, where tangible and asserted 
that enumerator effects were consequential. I took the position that the respondent would be 
primed by the interviewer residing in the opposite area as them and that it would precipitate the 
respondent being more likely to voice opinions that we opposite of opinions associated with the 
interviewer’s residency. This study argued that a rural Malian interviewed by an urban Malian 
would be less likely to support to increasing Western military presence and that an urban Malian 
interviewed by a rural Malian would express answers more favorable to Western military 
presence. 
 This study found a relationship that was inverse to the expected relationship. The result 
of the independent variables—mismatch of subject and interviewer residency—was not statically 
significant but close enough to justify further research. More statistically significant and 
impactful was where a person lived in context to the area occupied at the height of the Northern 
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Mali crisis. Ethnicity had varying statistical significance, yet remained substantial in effect. Age 
was very statistically significant, but with mild effects. 
 The lack of statistical significance by either of the independent variables suggest that 
being interviewed by a person of the opposite residency is not as consequential as anticipated. 
However, the fact that the results were approaching statistical significance indicates that a causal 
relation, of dissimilarity with the interviewer polarizing responses, does exist. This examination 
will need to be repeated to determine statistical significance. The effect size depicts enumerator 
effects being noticeably tangible. 
 Statistically significant results of strong effect with ethnicity and living proximity, to the 
area occupied at the height of the northern Mali crisis, reflect overlapping cleavages. This 
association aligns with the distribution of those features over geographic area. Perplexing was 
the strongest correlation towards favorability to Western military presence was the Afro-Berber 
ethnicity. Whereas, the strongest inverse correlation was the regions most affected by conflict, 
which are the regions Arab-Berbers inhabit most. This appears to mostly likely be explained as a 
weighting issue. While Arab-Berbers are most commonly found those in specified regions, they 
are still aren’t even a plurality in them. 
 The most statistically significant results reinforce intuitive knowledge that a person’s 
ethnicity and proximity to violence carried out with ethnic undertones will affect a person’s 
receptiveness to the proposition of a foreign military, in this case a Western military, intervening 
to halt the violence. However, the most intriguing result is that the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable was the inverse of what was theorized. 
 There are a few explanations for this. One is that the enumerator effect was present, but 
instead of being polarizing, it manifested as social desirability bias. Another is that the 
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assumption that rural individuals in Africa are less receptive to the West military presence 
because they are less exposed to the West is wrong. The argument I put forth was that less 
exposure to the West by rural individuals was the proximal cause of less favorability. It could be 
the case that one of the links in that chain of causation was an inference too far. However, this 
outcome should be observable in other African countries. 
 It is when the specific context of Mali is accounted for that the most plausible 
explanation appears. Perhaps, I asserted the correct argument that there would be a tangible 
polarizing social enumerator effect, but I assumed the wrong premise. It is unlikely that rural 
people across Africa are more receptive to a Western military than their urban compatriots. What 
is more likely is that Mali is the exception to this trend. The effects of the northern Mali crisis—a 
secular civil war that was exacerbated by the emergence of multiple VEOs with fluid structures 
that were combatted with superior Western military systems and further complicated by regional, 
continental and international peacekeeping actors—will be profound on the population’s 
opinions. The conflict has affected mostly rural Malians. It would be understandable that the 
rural-urban script is flipped in this case. This explanation aligns with breakdown of favorability 
for Western military presence by just residency exhibited in Figure 4. A fact that the social 
desirability bias explanation cannot reconcile. 
  




Receptiveness to Western military presence by rural or urban residency 
 
 
 A psychology professor won’t walk away from this paper with a conclusive answer as to 
what will prompt a social desirability bias versus a polarizing enumerator effect in these 
situations. A collections management officer in Bamako won’t be able to create a definitive field 
guide that will yield the most accurate human intelligence after reading this paper. A Foreign 
Service officer won’t come away wielding the levers of soft power differently in the west 
African bloc. However, they will know that the answers do exist out there and that they are one 
more step closer to it. One more practical step. 
 The academic is now cognizant of how inconspicuous traits between two interacting 
individuals can affect their opinions on macro issues. The intelligence operative will seek to 
marginalize the role of subtle extraneous variables and factor in a larger margin of error for 
qualitative information collected. The diplomat knows the demographics in Mali whose opinions 
of the United States have the most room for improvement and what the optimal demographics 
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